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+/*-
+ * SSLsplit - transparent SSL/TLS interception
+ * https://www.roe.ch/SSLsplit
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2009-2018, Daniel Roethlisberger <[email protected]>.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS''
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "ssl.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "defaults.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+
+/*
+ * Collection of helper functions on top of the OpenSSL API.
+ */
+
+
+/*
+ * Workaround for bug in OpenSSL 1.0.0k and 1.0.1e
+ * http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=703031
+ * http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/NULL-ptr-deref-when-calling-SSL-get-certificate-with-1-0-0k-td43636.html
+ */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x0090819fL) || \
+ (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x100000bfL) || \
+ (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x1000105fL)
+/*
+ * OpenSSL internal declarations from ssl_locl.h, reduced to what is needed.
+ */
+struct cert_pkey_st {
+ X509 *x509;
+ /*
+ EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
+ const EVP_MD *digest;
+ */
+};
+struct cert_st {
+ struct cert_pkey_st *key;
+ /* ... */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Replacement function for SSL_get_certificate().
+ */
+X509 *
+ssl_ssl_cert_get(SSL *s)
+{
+ return s->cert ? s->cert->key->x509 : NULL;
+}
+#endif /* OpenSSL 0.9.8y, 1.0.0k or 1.0.1e */
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+int
+DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+ /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. q may remain NULL.
+ */
+ if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+ || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->p);
+ dh->p = p;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->q);
+ dh->q = q;
+ }
+ if (g != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->g);
+ dh->g = g;
+ }
+
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ dh->length = BN_num_bits(q);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/*
+ * Print OpenSSL version and build-time configuration to standard error and
+ * return.
+ */
+void
+ssl_openssl_version(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "compiled against %s (%lx)\n",
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
+ (long unsigned int)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ fprintf(stderr, "rtlinked against %s (%lx)\n",
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
+ SSLeay());
+ if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ^ SSLeay()) & 0xfffff000L) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "---------------------------------------"
+ "---------------------------------------\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: OpenSSL version mismatch may "
+ "lead to crashes or other problems!\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "If there are multiple versions of "
+ "OpenSSL available, make sure to use\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "the same version of the library at "
+ "runtime as well as for compiling against.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "---------------------------------------"
+ "---------------------------------------\n");
+ }
+#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+ fprintf(stderr, "LibreSSL detected: %s (%lx)\n",
+ LIBRESSL_VERSION_TEXT,
+ (long unsigned int)LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+#endif /* LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ fprintf(stderr, "BoringSSL detected\n")
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ fprintf(stderr, "OpenSSL has support for TLS extensions\n"
+ "TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) supported\n");
+#else /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+ fprintf(stderr, "OpenSSL has no support for TLS extensions\n"
+ "TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) not supported\n");
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_THREADS
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_THREADID
+ fprintf(stderr, "OpenSSL is thread-safe with THREADID\n");
+#else /* OPENSSL_NO_THREADID */
+ fprintf(stderr, "OpenSSL is thread-safe without THREADID\n");
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_THREADID */
+#else /* !OPENSSL_THREADS */
+ fprintf(stderr, "OpenSSL is not thread-safe\n");
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_THREADS */
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS\n");
+#else /* !SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS */
+ fprintf(stderr, "Not using SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS\n");
+#endif /* !SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x0090819fL) || \
+ (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x100000bfL) || \
+ (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x1000105fL)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using direct access workaround when loading certs\n");
+#endif /* OpenSSL 0.9.8y, 1.0.0k or 1.0.1e */
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL/TLS protocol availability: %s\n",
+ SSL_PROTO_SUPPORT_S);
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL/TLS algorithm availability:");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
+ fprintf(stderr, " SHA0");
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SHA0 */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !SHA0");
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SHA0 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ fprintf(stderr, " RSA");
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !RSA");
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ fprintf(stderr, " DSA");
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !DSA");
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ fprintf(stderr, " ECDSA");
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !ECDSA");
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ fprintf(stderr, " DH");
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !DH");
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ fprintf(stderr, " ECDH");
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !ECDH");
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ fprintf(stderr, " EC");
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !EC");
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "OpenSSL option availability:");
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ fprintf(stderr, " SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION");
+#else /* !SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION");
+#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ fprintf(stderr, " SSL_OP_NO_TICKET");
+#else /* !SSL_OP_NO_TICKET */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !SSL_OP_NO_TICKET");
+#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ fprintf(stderr, " SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION");
+#else /* !SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION");
+#endif /* !SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+ fprintf(stderr, " SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS");
+#else /* !SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS");
+#endif /* !SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ fprintf(stderr, " SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION");
+#else /* !SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION");
+#endif /* !SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
+ fprintf(stderr, " SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG");
+#else /* !SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG */
+ fprintf(stderr, " !SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG");
+#endif /* !SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG */
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * 1 if OpenSSL has been initialized, 0 if not. When calling a _load()
+ * function the first time, OpenSSL will automatically be initialized.
+ * Not protected by a mutex and thus not thread-safe.
+ */
+static int ssl_initialized = 0;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value {
+ pthread_mutex_t mutex;
+};
+static pthread_mutex_t *ssl_mutex;
+static int ssl_mutex_num;
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL thread-safety locking callback, #1.
+ */
+static void
+ssl_thr_locking_cb(int mode, int type, UNUSED const char *file,
+ UNUSED int line) {
+ if (type < ssl_mutex_num) {
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK)
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&ssl_mutex[type]);
+ else
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_mutex[type]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL thread-safety locking callback, #2.
+ */
+static struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *
+ssl_thr_dyn_create_cb(UNUSED const char *file, UNUSED int line)
+{
+ struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *dl;
+
+ if ((dl = malloc(sizeof(struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value)))) {
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&dl->mutex, NULL)) {
+ free(dl);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return dl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL thread-safety locking callback, #3.
+ */
+static void
+ssl_thr_dyn_lock_cb(int mode, struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *dl,
+ UNUSED const char *file, UNUSED int line)
+{
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&dl->mutex);
+ } else {
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&dl->mutex);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL thread-safety locking callback, #4.
+ */
+static void
+ssl_thr_dyn_destroy_cb(struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *dl,
+ UNUSED const char *file, UNUSED int line)
+{
+ pthread_mutex_destroy(&dl->mutex);
+ free(dl);
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_THREADID
+/*
+ * OpenSSL thread-safety thread ID callback, legacy version.
+ */
+static unsigned long
+ssl_thr_id_cb(void) {
+ return (unsigned long) pthread_self();
+}
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_THREADID */
+/*
+ * OpenSSL thread-safety thread ID callback, up-to-date version.
+ */
+static void
+ssl_thr_id_cb(CRYPTO_THREADID *id)
+{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, (unsigned long) pthread_self());
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_THREADID */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_THREADS */
+
+/*
+ * Initialize OpenSSL and verify the random number generator works.
+ * Returns -1 on failure, 0 on success.
+ */
+int
+ssl_init(void)
+{
+#ifndef PURIFY
+ int fd;
+#endif /* !PURIFY */
+ char buf[256];
+
+ if (ssl_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* general initialization */
+ SSL_library_init();
+#ifdef PURIFY
+ CRYPTO_malloc_init();
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+#endif /* PURIFY */
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+
+ /* thread-safety */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ ssl_mutex_num = CRYPTO_num_locks();
+ ssl_mutex = malloc(ssl_mutex_num * sizeof(*ssl_mutex));
+ for (int i = 0; i < ssl_mutex_num; i++) {
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&ssl_mutex[i], NULL)) {
+ log_err_printf("Failed to initialize mutex\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(ssl_thr_locking_cb);
+ CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(ssl_thr_dyn_create_cb);
+ CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(ssl_thr_dyn_lock_cb);
+ CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(ssl_thr_dyn_destroy_cb);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_THREADID
+ CRYPTO_set_id_callback(ssl_thr_id_cb);
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_THREADID */
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(ssl_thr_id_cb);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_THREADID */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_THREADS */
+
+ /* randomness */
+#ifndef PURIFY
+ if ((fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+ log_err_printf("Error opening /dev/urandom for reading: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ while (!RAND_status()) {
+ if (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1) {
+ log_err_printf("Error reading from /dev/urandom: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ if (!RAND_poll()) {
+ log_err_printf("RAND_poll() failed.\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+#else /* PURIFY */
+ log_err_printf("Warning: not seeding OpenSSL RAND due to PURITY!\n");
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ while (!RAND_status()) {
+ RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ }
+#endif /* PURIFY */
+
+#ifdef USE_FOOTPRINT_HACKS
+ /* HACK: disable compression by zeroing the global comp algo stack.
+ * This lowers the per-connection memory footprint by ~500k. */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)* comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+ sk_SSL_COMP_zero(comp_methods);
+#endif /* USE_FOOTPRINT_HACKS */
+
+ ssl_initialized = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Re-initialize OpenSSL after forking. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssl_reinit(void)
+{
+ if (!ssl_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ for (int i = 0; i < ssl_mutex_num; i++) {
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&ssl_mutex[i], NULL)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_THREADS */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deinitialize OpenSSL and free as much memory as possible.
+ * Some 10k-100k will still remain resident no matter what.
+ */
+void
+ssl_fini(void)
+{
+ if (!ssl_initialized)
+ return;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ ERR_remove_state(0); /* current thread */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
+ CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(NULL);
+ CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(NULL);
+ CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(NULL);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_THREADID
+ CRYPTO_set_id_callback(NULL);
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_THREADID */
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(NULL);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_THREADID */
+ for (int i = 0; i < ssl_mutex_num; i++) {
+ pthread_mutex_destroy(&ssl_mutex[i]);
+ }
+ free(ssl_mutex);
+#endif
+
+ ENGINE_cleanup();
+ CONF_modules_finish();
+ CONF_modules_unload(1);
+ CONF_modules_free();
+
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ ERR_free_strings();
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Format raw SHA1 hash into newly allocated string, with or without colons.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_sha1_to_str(unsigned char *rawhash, int colons)
+{
+ char *str;
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = asprintf(&str, colons ?
+ "%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X"
+ "%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X" :
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X",
+ rawhash[ 0], rawhash[ 1], rawhash[ 2], rawhash[ 3],
+ rawhash[ 4], rawhash[ 5], rawhash[ 6], rawhash[ 7],
+ rawhash[ 8], rawhash[ 9], rawhash[10], rawhash[11],
+ rawhash[12], rawhash[13], rawhash[14], rawhash[15],
+ rawhash[16], rawhash[17], rawhash[18], rawhash[19]);
+ if (rv == -1)
+ return NULL;
+ return str;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Format SSL state into newly allocated string.
+ * Returns pointer to string that must be freed by caller, or NULL on error.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_ssl_state_to_str(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ char *str = NULL;
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = asprintf(&str, "%08x = %s%s%04x = %s (%s) [%s]",
+ SSL_get_state(ssl),
+ (SSL_get_state(ssl) & SSL_ST_CONNECT) ? "SSL_ST_CONNECT|" : "",
+ (SSL_get_state(ssl) & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) ? "SSL_ST_ACCEPT|" : "",
+ SSL_get_state(ssl) & SSL_ST_MASK,
+ SSL_state_string(ssl),
+ SSL_state_string_long(ssl),
+ SSL_is_server(ssl) ? "accept socket" : "connect socket");
+
+ return (rv < 0) ? NULL : str;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates a NSS key log format compatible string containing the client
+ * random and the master key, intended to be used to decrypt externally
+ * captured network traffic using tools like Wireshark.
+ *
+ * Only supports the CLIENT_RANDOM method (SSL 3.0 - TLS 1.2).
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format
+ */
+char *
+ssl_ssl_masterkey_to_str(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ char *str = NULL;
+ int rv;
+ unsigned char *k, *r;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ unsigned char kbuf[48], rbuf[32];
+ k = &kbuf[0];
+ r = &rbuf[0];
+ SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_get0_session(ssl), k, sizeof(kbuf));
+ SSL_get_client_random(ssl, r, sizeof(rbuf));
+#else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L */
+ k = ssl->session->master_key;
+ r = ssl->s3->client_random;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L */
+ rv = asprintf(&str,
+ "CLIENT_RANDOM "
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ " "
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X"
+ "\n",
+ r[ 0], r[ 1], r[ 2], r[ 3], r[ 4], r[ 5], r[ 6], r[ 7],
+ r[ 8], r[ 9], r[10], r[11], r[12], r[13], r[14], r[15],
+ r[16], r[17], r[18], r[19], r[20], r[21], r[22], r[23],
+ r[24], r[25], r[26], r[27], r[28], r[29], r[30], r[31],
+ k[ 0], k[ 1], k[ 2], k[ 3], k[ 4], k[ 5], k[ 6], k[ 7],
+ k[ 8], k[ 9], k[10], k[11], k[12], k[13], k[14], k[15],
+ k[16], k[17], k[18], k[19], k[20], k[21], k[22], k[23],
+ k[24], k[25], k[26], k[27], k[28], k[29], k[30], k[31],
+ k[32], k[33], k[34], k[35], k[36], k[37], k[38], k[39],
+ k[40], k[41], k[42], k[43], k[44], k[45], k[46], k[47]);
+
+ return (rv < 0) ? NULL : str;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static unsigned char dh_g[] = { 0x02 };
+static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
+ 0xAB, 0xC0, 0x34, 0x16, 0x95, 0x8B, 0x57, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0x6E,
+ 0x16, 0x0B, 0x35, 0xC5, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0xD3, 0xE5, 0x46, 0xE2, 0x23,
+ 0x6A, 0x5B, 0xBB, 0x5D, 0x3D, 0x52, 0xEA, 0xCE, 0x4F, 0x7D, 0xCA, 0xFF,
+ 0xB4, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0x78, 0xDC, 0xA0, 0xFC, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0xB5, 0xE6, 0x61,
+ 0xA6, 0x6D, 0x58, 0xFC, 0xA0, 0x0F, 0xF7, 0x9B, 0x97, 0xE6, 0xC7, 0xE8,
+ 0x1F, 0xCD, 0x16, 0x73 };
+static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+ 0x99, 0x28, 0x34, 0x48, 0x9E, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0x4F, 0x0D, 0x17, 0x09, 0x97,
+ 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x20, 0xFE, 0xE5, 0x65, 0xE0, 0xE2, 0x56, 0x37, 0x80, 0xA2,
+ 0x9F, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x87, 0x10, 0x58, 0x39, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xA9, 0x08,
+ 0x24, 0xC7, 0xAA, 0xA9, 0x29, 0x3A, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x4E, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x11,
+ 0x39, 0xB1, 0x1C, 0x3F, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0x0A, 0x5E, 0xAD, 0x2E, 0x5C, 0x10,
+ 0x97, 0x38, 0xAC, 0xE8, 0xEB, 0xAA, 0x4A, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x27,
+ 0x65, 0x9C, 0xC8, 0x53, 0xAC, 0x35, 0xDD, 0x84, 0x1F, 0x47, 0x0E, 0x04,
+ 0xF1, 0x90, 0x61, 0x62, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x2C, 0xC6, 0x28, 0x91, 0x6D, 0xF0,
+ 0xE2, 0x5E, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x3E, 0xF7, 0xF8, 0x37, 0x99, 0x4D, 0x9F, 0xFB,
+ 0x68, 0xEC, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x32, 0x74, 0xD1, 0xAA, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xF5, 0xCD,
+ 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xD7, 0xAC, 0xDA, 0x69, 0xF5, 0x2B };
+static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = {
+ 0xAB, 0x88, 0x97, 0xCA, 0xF1, 0xE1, 0x60, 0x39, 0xFA, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0x7D,
+ 0xB3, 0x7A, 0x38, 0x08, 0xF0, 0x7A, 0x3D, 0x21, 0xC4, 0xE6, 0xB8, 0x32,
+ 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x59, 0x47, 0xB2, 0x0A, 0x7A, 0x3A,
+ 0x20, 0x2A, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xB9, 0xB9,
+ 0x65, 0x47, 0xCC, 0x13, 0x99, 0xD7, 0xA6, 0xCA, 0xFF, 0x23, 0x05, 0x91,
+ 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x82, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x2E, 0x5B, 0x0F, 0x8E, 0x03,
+ 0x3C, 0x23, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xE2, 0x83, 0x95, 0xD2, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xDF, 0x3A,
+ 0xAF, 0x89, 0xF0, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x09, 0x12, 0xF6, 0x54, 0x54, 0x93, 0xF4,
+ 0xD4, 0x41, 0x56, 0x7A, 0x0E, 0x56, 0x20, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0xBA, 0x3F, 0x07,
+ 0xD2, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x40, 0xD0, 0x1C, 0x08, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x7F, 0x34, 0xF4,
+ 0x28, 0x4E, 0xF7, 0x53, 0x8D, 0x4A, 0x00, 0xC3, 0xC0, 0x89, 0x9E, 0x63,
+ 0x96, 0xE9, 0x52, 0xDF, 0xA5, 0x2C, 0x00, 0x4E, 0xB0, 0x82, 0x6A, 0x10,
+ 0x28, 0x8D, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0xD6, 0xC1, 0xC0, 0x4D, 0x91,
+ 0xC4, 0x6F, 0xD3, 0x99, 0xD1, 0x86, 0x71, 0x67, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0xFC, 0xF4,
+ 0x7D, 0x40, 0x88, 0x8D, 0xAC, 0xCB, 0xBC, 0xEA, 0x17, 0x85, 0x0B, 0xC6,
+ 0x12, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xB9, 0x60, 0x74, 0x93, 0x54, 0x14, 0x39, 0x10, 0xBF,
+ 0x21, 0xB0, 0x8B, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x3F, 0xBB, 0x6A, 0x1F, 0x42, 0x82, 0x0A,
+ 0x40, 0x3A, 0x15, 0xCD, 0xD3, 0x79, 0xD0, 0x02, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x79, 0x78,
+ 0x03, 0xBD, 0x47, 0xCC, 0xD5, 0x08, 0x6A, 0x46, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xE4, 0xCD,
+ 0xB1, 0x17, 0x48, 0x30, 0xB4, 0x02, 0xBC, 0x50, 0x68, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x76,
+ 0xD0, 0x5C, 0xB9, 0xE6, 0xBE, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0x50, 0xEF, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0x39,
+ 0x4F, 0x53, 0x16, 0x3B };
+static unsigned char dh4096_p[] = {
+ 0xB1, 0xCC, 0x09, 0x86, 0xEE, 0xF9, 0xB9, 0xC9, 0xB9, 0x87, 0xC4, 0xB9,
+ 0xD7, 0x31, 0x95, 0x84, 0x94, 0x65, 0xED, 0x82, 0x64, 0x11, 0xA7, 0x0A,
+ 0xFE, 0xC2, 0x60, 0xAE, 0x7C, 0x74, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x8F, 0x0D, 0xA6, 0xDD,
+ 0x02, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x69, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x05, 0xBE, 0x5E, 0x9B, 0x09, 0x83,
+ 0xD8, 0xF3, 0x91, 0x55, 0x30, 0x86, 0x97, 0x6C, 0x48, 0x7B, 0x99, 0x82,
+ 0xCC, 0x1E, 0x1E, 0x25, 0xE6, 0x25, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x66, 0xDE, 0x8A, 0x78,
+ 0xEE, 0x7F, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x95, 0x06, 0xBE, 0x64, 0x86, 0xFD, 0x60, 0x6A,
+ 0x3F, 0x0D, 0x8F, 0x62, 0x17, 0x89, 0xDB, 0xE1, 0x01, 0xC1, 0x75, 0x3A,
+ 0x78, 0x42, 0xA8, 0x26, 0xEC, 0x00, 0x78, 0xF3, 0xDA, 0x40, 0x8D, 0x0D,
+ 0x4D, 0x53, 0x82, 0xD7, 0x21, 0xC8, 0x46, 0xC9, 0xE3, 0x80, 0xB4, 0xCF,
+ 0xEA, 0x46, 0x85, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x9D, 0xD0, 0xC0, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x0F, 0xF8,
+ 0x34, 0x3B, 0x86, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0x40, 0x56, 0x49, 0x64, 0x76, 0x61, 0xBC,
+ 0x35, 0x6A, 0xB8, 0xC5, 0x32, 0x19, 0x00, 0x5E, 0x21, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xCB,
+ 0x74, 0x5B, 0x60, 0x85, 0x8C, 0x38, 0x52, 0x50, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0x25, 0xE4,
+ 0x1A, 0xE6, 0xE4, 0xDF, 0x0A, 0xD2, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0xD1, 0x35, 0xC7, 0x92,
+ 0x7D, 0x6F, 0x54, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x3F, 0xFB, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xAC,
+ 0x64, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x30, 0xEA, 0x8E, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0xC0, 0x9E, 0x0B, 0xBF,
+ 0x34, 0xAC, 0x79, 0x96, 0x38, 0x31, 0x1E, 0xEA, 0xF2, 0x7E, 0xEE, 0x0A,
+ 0x10, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x1A, 0x30, 0x5F, 0xAF, 0x96, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0x1D,
+ 0xA7, 0x3D, 0x35, 0x7A, 0x30, 0x70, 0x40, 0xE7, 0xD6, 0x22, 0x1E, 0xD0,
+ 0x9A, 0x34, 0xC7, 0x6B, 0xE4, 0xF1, 0x78, 0xED, 0xD9, 0xCD, 0x18, 0xBF,
+ 0x2A, 0x1A, 0x98, 0xB7, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x18, 0x40, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0xE4,
+ 0x78, 0x8E, 0x34, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0xE5, 0x88, 0xE6, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xBD, 0xBB,
+ 0x2E, 0x30, 0x72, 0x54, 0xC7, 0xF4, 0xA0, 0xF1, 0x25, 0xFF, 0xB1, 0x37,
+ 0x42, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xF2, 0xB9, 0xA1, 0xA4, 0xA7, 0x76, 0x39, 0xB8, 0x11,
+ 0x17, 0xF3, 0xA8, 0x2E, 0x78, 0x68, 0xF4, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x25, 0x59, 0x17,
+ 0x59, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0x0B, 0x9B, 0xE3, 0x0F, 0xFF, 0xDC, 0xC8, 0x47, 0x21,
+ 0xE1, 0x0B, 0x9A, 0x44, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0x8E, 0x83, 0x1E, 0x04, 0xA1,
+ 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xD9, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0x03, 0xBC, 0x0A,
+ 0x04, 0x00, 0x5C, 0x59, 0xB7, 0x51, 0xAA, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x03, 0x07,
+ 0x81, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x28, 0x37, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x5B, 0x8C, 0x2A, 0x4B,
+ 0x6C, 0x10, 0x92, 0x75, 0xA5, 0x79, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0x30, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0xD6,
+ 0x9E, 0x16, 0xC2, 0x87, 0x69, 0x34, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0x2A, 0x4F, 0xD6, 0xC0,
+ 0xF3, 0xCD, 0x9C, 0x46, 0xED, 0xC0, 0xB2, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x7E, 0x93, 0xD2,
+ 0xE9, 0xBE, 0x59, 0x18, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x2C, 0xD6, 0x6C, 0x71, 0x50, 0xA1,
+ 0x98, 0xDA, 0xD1, 0xAC, 0xDB, 0x88, 0x40, 0x1F, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xDB, 0xB2,
+ 0xA0, 0x90, 0x01, 0x8E, 0x12, 0xD6, 0x40, 0x1A, 0x8E, 0xC5, 0x69, 0x9C,
+ 0x91, 0x67, 0xAC, 0xD8, 0x4C, 0x27, 0xCD, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x32, 0x97, 0xE1,
+ 0x13, 0x0C, 0xFF, 0xB1, 0x06, 0x65, 0x03, 0x98, 0x6F, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xB8,
+ 0xA8, 0x75, 0xBA, 0x59, 0xFD, 0x23, 0x98, 0x94, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xA7, 0x46,
+ 0x32, 0x98, 0x28, 0x7A, 0x0A, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x52, 0x8E,
+ 0x8F, 0x2C, 0xC9, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x59, 0x99, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x88,
+ 0x36, 0xD3, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0x73, 0xFA, 0x89, 0xBB,
+};
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL temporary DH callback which loads DH parameters from static memory.
+ */
+DH *
+ssl_tmp_dh_callback(UNUSED SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (!(dh = DH_new())) {
+ log_err_printf("DH_new() failed\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ switch (keylength) {
+ case 512:
+ rv = DH_set0_pqg(dh,
+ BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL),
+ NULL,
+ BN_bin2bn(dh_g, sizeof(dh_g), NULL));
+ break;
+ case 1024:
+ rv = DH_set0_pqg(dh,
+ BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL),
+ NULL,
+ BN_bin2bn(dh_g, sizeof(dh_g), NULL));
+ break;
+ case 2048:
+ rv = DH_set0_pqg(dh,
+ BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL),
+ NULL,
+ BN_bin2bn(dh_g, sizeof(dh_g), NULL));
+ break;
+ case 4096:
+ rv = DH_set0_pqg(dh,
+ BN_bin2bn(dh4096_p, sizeof(dh4096_p), NULL),
+ NULL,
+ BN_bin2bn(dh_g, sizeof(dh_g), NULL));
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_err_printf("Unhandled DH keylength %i%s\n",
+ keylength,
+ (is_export ? " (export)" : ""));
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!rv) {
+ log_err_printf("Failed to load DH p and g from memory\n");
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return(dh);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load DH parameters from a PEM file.
+ * Not thread-safe.
+ */
+DH *
+ssl_dh_load(const char *filename)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+ FILE *fh;
+
+ if (ssl_init() == -1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!(fh = fopen(filename, "r"))) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ dh = PEM_read_DHparams(fh, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fclose(fh);
+ return dh;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*
+ * Load an Elliptic Curve by name. If curvename is NULL, a default curve is
+ * loaded.
+ */
+EC_KEY *
+ssl_ec_by_name(const char *curvename)
+{
+ int nid;
+
+ if (!curvename)
+ curvename = DFLT_CURVE;
+
+ if ((nid = OBJ_sn2nid(curvename)) == NID_undef) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+/*
+ * Add a X509v3 extension to a certificate and handle errors.
+ * Returns -1 on errors, 0 on success.
+ */
+int
+ssl_x509_v3ext_add(X509V3_CTX *ctx, X509 *crt, char *k, char *v)
+{
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+
+ if (!(ext = X509V3_EXT_conf(NULL, ctx, k, v))) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (X509_add_ext(crt, ext, -1) != 1) {
+ X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy a X509v3 extension from one certificate to another.
+ * If the extension is not present in the original certificate,
+ * the extension will not be added to the destination certificate.
+ * Returns 1 if ext was copied, 0 if not present in origcrt, -1 on error.
+ */
+int
+ssl_x509_v3ext_copy_by_nid(X509 *crt, X509 *origcrt, int nid)
+{
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ int pos;
+
+ pos = X509_get_ext_by_NID(origcrt, nid, -1);
+ if (pos == -1)
+ return 0;
+ ext = X509_get_ext(origcrt, pos);
+ if (!ext)
+ return -1;
+ if (X509_add_ext(crt, ext, -1) != 1)
+ return -1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Best effort randomness generator.
+ * Not for real life cryptography applications.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssl_rand(void *p, size_t sz)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ rv = RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char*)p, sz);
+ if (rv == 1)
+ return 0;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L */
+ rv = RAND_bytes((unsigned char*)p, sz);
+ if (rv == 1)
+ return 0;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the serial number from src certificate to dst certificate
+ * and modify it by a random offset.
+ * If reading the serial fails for some reason, generate a new
+ * random serial and store it in the dst certificate.
+ * Using the same serial is not a good idea since some SSL stacks
+ * check for duplicate certificate serials.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error.
+ */
+int
+ssl_x509_serial_copyrand(X509 *dstcrt, X509 *srccrt)
+{
+ ASN1_INTEGER *srcptr, *dstptr;
+ BIGNUM *bnserial;
+ unsigned int rand;
+ int rv;
+
+#ifndef PURIFY
+ rv = ssl_rand(&rand, sizeof(rand));
+#else /* PURIFY */
+ rand = 0xF001;
+ rv = 0;
+#endif /* PURIFY */
+ dstptr = X509_get_serialNumber(dstcrt);
+ srcptr = X509_get_serialNumber(srccrt);
+ if ((rv == -1) || !dstptr || !srcptr)
+ return -1;
+ bnserial = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(srcptr, NULL);
+ if (!bnserial) {
+ /* random 32-bit serial */
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(dstptr, rand);
+ } else {
+ /* original serial plus random 32-bit offset */
+ BN_add_word(bnserial, rand);
+ BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bnserial, dstptr);
+ BN_free(bnserial);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a fake X509v3 certificate, signed by the provided CA,
+ * based on the original certificate retrieved from the real server.
+ * The returned certificate is created using X509_new() and thus must
+ * be freed by the caller using X509_free().
+ * The optional argument extraname is added to subjectAltNames if provided.
+ */
+X509 *
+ssl_x509_forge(X509 *cacrt, EVP_PKEY *cakey, X509 *origcrt, EVP_PKEY *key,
+ const char *extraname, const char *crlurl)
+{
+ X509_NAME *subject, *issuer;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *names;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gn;
+ X509 *crt;
+ int rv;
+
+ subject = X509_get_subject_name(origcrt);
+ issuer = X509_get_subject_name(cacrt);
+ if (!subject || !issuer)
+ return NULL;
+
+ crt = X509_new();
+ if (!crt)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!X509_set_version(crt, 0x02) ||
+ !X509_set_subject_name(crt, subject) ||
+ !X509_set_issuer_name(crt, issuer) ||
+ ssl_x509_serial_copyrand(crt, origcrt) == -1 ||
+ !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(crt), (long)-60*60*24) ||
+ !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(crt), (long)60*60*24*364) ||
+ !X509_set_pubkey(crt, key))
+ goto errout;
+
+ /* add standard v3 extensions; cf. RFC 2459 */
+
+ X509V3_CTX ctx;
+ X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, cacrt, crt, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (ssl_x509_v3ext_add(&ctx, crt, "subjectKeyIdentifier",
+ "hash") == -1 ||
+ ssl_x509_v3ext_add(&ctx, crt, "authorityKeyIdentifier",
+ "keyid,issuer:always") == -1)
+ goto errout;
+
+ rv = ssl_x509_v3ext_copy_by_nid(crt, origcrt,
+ NID_basic_constraints);
+ if (rv == 0)
+ rv = ssl_x509_v3ext_add(&ctx, crt, "basicConstraints",
+ "CA:FALSE");
+ if (rv == -1)
+ goto errout;
+
+ rv = ssl_x509_v3ext_copy_by_nid(crt, origcrt,
+ NID_key_usage);
+ if (rv == 0)
+ rv = ssl_x509_v3ext_add(&ctx, crt, "keyUsage",
+ "digitalSignature,"
+ "keyEncipherment");
+ if (rv == -1)
+ goto errout;
+
+ rv = ssl_x509_v3ext_copy_by_nid(crt, origcrt,
+ NID_ext_key_usage);
+ if (rv == 0)
+ rv = ssl_x509_v3ext_add(&ctx, crt, "extendedKeyUsage",
+ "serverAuth");
+ if (rv == -1)
+ goto errout;
+
+ if (crlurl) {
+ char *crlurlval;
+ if (asprintf(&crlurlval, "URI:%s", crlurl) < 0)
+ goto errout;
+ if (ssl_x509_v3ext_add(&ctx, crt, "crlDistributionPoints",
+ crlurlval) == -1) {
+ free(crlurlval);
+ goto errout;
+ }
+ free(crlurlval);
+ }
+
+ if (!extraname) {
+ /* no extraname provided: copy original subjectAltName ext */
+ if (ssl_x509_v3ext_copy_by_nid(crt, origcrt,
+ NID_subject_alt_name) == -1)
+ goto errout;
+ } else {
+ names = X509_get_ext_d2i(origcrt, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0);
+ if (!names) {
+ /* no subjectAltName present: add new one */
+ char *cfval;
+ if (asprintf(&cfval, "DNS:%s", extraname) < 0)
+ goto errout;
+ if (ssl_x509_v3ext_add(&ctx, crt, "subjectAltName",
+ cfval) == -1) {
+ free(cfval);
+ goto errout;
+ }
+ free(cfval);
+ } else {
+ /* add extraname to original subjectAltName
+ * and add it to the new certificate */
+ gn = GENERAL_NAME_new();
+ if (!gn)
+ goto errout2;
+ gn->type = GEN_DNS;
+ gn->d.dNSName = ASN1_IA5STRING_new();
+ if (!gn->d.dNSName)
+ goto errout3;
+ ASN1_STRING_set(gn->d.dNSName,
+ (unsigned char *)extraname,
+ strlen(extraname));
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(names, gn);
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509V3_EXT_i2d(
+ NID_subject_alt_name, 0, names);
+ if (!X509_add_ext(crt, ext, -1)) {
+ if (ext) {
+ X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+ }
+ goto errout3;
+ }
+ X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_CERTIFICATE
+ ssl_x509_v3ext_add(&ctx, crt, "nsComment", "Generated by " PKGLABEL);
+#endif /* DEBUG_CERTIFICATE */
+
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_type(EVP_PKEY_base_id(cakey))) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ switch (X509_get_signature_nid(origcrt)) {
+ case NID_md5WithRSAEncryption:
+ md = EVP_md5();
+ break;
+ case NID_ripemd160WithRSA:
+ md = EVP_ripemd160();
+ break;
+ case NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ break;
+ case NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
+ md = EVP_sha224();
+ break;
+ case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
+ md = EVP_sha256();
+ break;
+ case NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
+ md = EVP_sha384();
+ break;
+ case NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
+ md = EVP_sha512();
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
+ case NID_shaWithRSAEncryption:
+ md = EVP_sha();
+ break;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SHA0 */
+ default:
+ md = EVP_sha256();
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ switch (X509_get_signature_nid(origcrt)) {
+ case NID_dsaWithSHA1:
+ case NID_dsaWithSHA1_2:
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ break;
+ case NID_dsa_with_SHA224:
+ md = EVP_sha224();
+ break;
+ case NID_dsa_with_SHA256:
+ md = EVP_sha256();
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
+ case NID_dsaWithSHA:
+ md = EVP_sha();
+ break;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SHA0 */
+ default:
+ md = EVP_sha256();
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ switch (X509_get_signature_nid(origcrt)) {
+ case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1:
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ break;
+ case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224:
+ md = EVP_sha224();
+ break;
+ case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256:
+ md = EVP_sha256();
+ break;
+ case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384:
+ md = EVP_sha384();
+ break;
+ case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512:
+ md = EVP_sha512();
+ break;
+ default:
+ md = EVP_sha256();
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA */
+ default:
+ goto errout;
+ }
+ if (!X509_sign(crt, cakey, md))
+ goto errout;
+
+ return crt;
+
+errout3:
+ GENERAL_NAME_free(gn);
+errout2:
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+errout:
+ X509_free(crt);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load a X509 certificate chain from a PEM file.
+ * Returns the first certificate in *crt and all subsequent certificates in
+ * *chain. If crt is NULL, the first certificate is prepended to *chain
+ * instead of returned separately. If *chain is NULL, a new stack of X509*
+ * is created in *chain, else the certs are pushed onto an existing stack.
+ * Returns -1 on error.
+ * Not thread-safe.
+ *
+ * By accessing (SSLCTX*)->extra_certs directly on OpenSSL before 1.0.2, we
+ * depend on OpenSSL internals in this function. OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced
+ * the SSL_get0_chain_certs() API for accessing the certificate chain.
+ */
+int
+ssl_x509chain_load(X509 **crt, STACK_OF(X509) **chain, const char *filename)
+{
+ X509 *tmpcrt;
+ SSL_CTX *tmpctx;
+ SSL *tmpssl;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *tmpchain;
+ int rv;
+
+ if (ssl_init() == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ tmpctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
+ if (!tmpctx)
+ goto leave1;
+
+ rv = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(tmpctx, filename);
+ if (rv != 1)
+ goto leave2;
+ tmpssl = SSL_new(tmpctx);
+ if (!tmpssl)
+ goto leave2;
+
+ tmpcrt = SSL_get_certificate(tmpssl);
+ if (!tmpcrt)
+ goto leave3;
+
+ if (!*chain) {
+ *chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (!*chain)
+ goto leave3;
+ }
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000200fL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ tmpchain = tmpctx->extra_certs;
+#else /* OpenSSL >= 1.0.2 */
+ rv = SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(tmpctx, &tmpchain);
+ if (rv != 1)
+ goto leave3;
+#endif /* OpenSSL >= 1.0.2 */
+
+ if (crt) {
+ *crt = tmpcrt;
+ } else {
+ sk_X509_push(*chain, tmpcrt);
+ }
+ ssl_x509_refcount_inc(tmpcrt);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(tmpchain); i++) {
+ tmpcrt = sk_X509_value(tmpchain, i);
+ ssl_x509_refcount_inc(tmpcrt);
+ sk_X509_push(*chain, tmpcrt);
+ }
+ SSL_free(tmpssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(tmpctx);
+ return 0;
+
+leave3:
+ SSL_free(tmpssl);
+leave2:
+ SSL_CTX_free(tmpctx);
+leave1:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use a X509 certificate chain for an SSL context.
+ * Copies the certificate stack to the SSL_CTX internal data structures
+ * and increases reference counts accordingly.
+ */
+void
+ssl_x509chain_use(SSL_CTX *sslctx, X509 *crt, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ SSL_CTX_use_certificate(sslctx, crt);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ X509 *tmpcrt;
+
+ tmpcrt = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ ssl_x509_refcount_inc(tmpcrt);
+ SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(sslctx, tmpcrt);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load a X509 certificate from a PEM file.
+ * Returned X509 must be freed using X509_free() by the caller.
+ * Not thread-safe.
+ */
+X509 *
+ssl_x509_load(const char *filename)
+{
+ X509 *crt = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *tmpctx;
+ SSL *tmpssl;
+ int rv;
+
+ if (ssl_init() == -1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ tmpctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
+ if (!tmpctx)
+ goto leave1;
+ rv = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(tmpctx, filename, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ if (rv != 1)
+ goto leave2;
+ tmpssl = SSL_new(tmpctx);
+ if (!tmpssl)
+ goto leave2;
+ crt = SSL_get_certificate(tmpssl);
+ if (crt)
+ ssl_x509_refcount_inc(crt);
+ SSL_free(tmpssl);
+leave2:
+ SSL_CTX_free(tmpctx);
+leave1:
+ return crt;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load a private key from a PEM file.
+ * Returned EVP_PKEY must be freed using EVP_PKEY_free() by the caller.
+ * Not thread-safe.
+ */
+EVP_PKEY *
+ssl_key_load(const char *filename)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *tmpctx;
+ SSL *tmpssl;
+ int rv;
+
+ if (ssl_init() == -1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ tmpctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
+ if (!tmpctx)
+ goto leave1;
+ rv = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(tmpctx, filename, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ if (rv != 1)
+ goto leave2;
+ tmpssl = SSL_new(tmpctx);
+ if (!tmpssl)
+ goto leave2;
+ key = SSL_get_privatekey(tmpssl);
+ if (key)
+ ssl_key_refcount_inc(key);
+ SSL_free(tmpssl);
+leave2:
+ SSL_CTX_free(tmpctx);
+leave1:
+ return key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a new RSA key.
+ * Returned EVP_PKEY must be freed using EVP_PKEY_free() by the caller.
+ */
+EVP_PKEY *
+ssl_key_genrsa(const int keysize)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ RSA *rsa;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ BIGNUM *bn;
+ int rv;
+ rsa = RSA_new();
+ bn = BN_new();
+ BN_dec2bn(&bn, "3");
+ rv = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, keysize, bn, NULL);
+ BN_free(bn);
+ if (rv != 1) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L */
+ rsa = RSA_generate_key(keysize, 3, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!rsa)
+ return NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L */
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); /* does not increment refcount */
+ return pkey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the subjectKeyIdentifier compatible key id of the public key.
+ * keyid will receive a binary SHA-1 hash of SSL_KEY_IDSZ bytes.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssl_key_identifier_sha1(EVP_PKEY *key, unsigned char *keyid)
+{
+ X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *pk;
+ int length;
+
+ /* X509_PUBKEY_set() will attempt to free pubkey if != NULL */
+ if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pubkey, key) != 1 || !pubkey)
+ return -1;
+ if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &pk, &length, NULL, pubkey))
+ goto errout;
+ if (!EVP_Digest(pk, length, keyid, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ goto errout;
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(pubkey);
+ return 0;
+
+errout:
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(pubkey);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the result of ssl_key_identifier_sha1() as hex characters with or
+ * without colons in a newly allocated string.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_key_identifier(EVP_PKEY *key, int colons)
+{
+ unsigned char id[SSL_KEY_IDSZ];
+
+ if (ssl_key_identifier_sha1(key, id) == -1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return ssl_sha1_to_str(id, colons);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the one-line representation of the subject DN in a newly allocated
+ * string which must be freed by the caller.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_x509_subject(X509 *crt)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(crt), NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse the common name from the subject distinguished name.
+ * Returns string allocated using malloc(), caller must free().
+ * Returns NULL on errors.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_x509_subject_cn(X509 *crt, size_t *psz)
+{
+ X509_NAME *ptr;
+ char *cn;
+ size_t sz;
+
+ ptr = X509_get_subject_name(crt); /* does not inc refcounts */
+ if (!ptr)
+ return NULL;
+ sz = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(ptr, NID_commonName, NULL, 0) + 1;
+ if ((sz == 0) || !(cn = malloc(sz)))
+ return NULL;
+ if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(ptr, NID_commonName, cn, sz) == -1) {
+ free(cn);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *psz = sz;
+ return cn;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the SHA1 fingerprint of certificate to fpr as SSL_X509_FPRSZ (20)
+ * bytes long binary buffer.
+ * Returns -1 on error, 0 on success.
+ */
+int
+ssl_x509_fingerprint_sha1(X509 *crt, unsigned char *fpr)
+{
+ unsigned int sz = SSL_X509_FPRSZ;
+
+ return X509_digest(crt, EVP_sha1(), fpr, &sz) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the result of ssl_x509_fingerprint_sha1() as hex characters with or
+ * without colons in a newly allocated string.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_x509_fingerprint(X509 *crt, int colons)
+{
+ unsigned char fpr[SSL_X509_FPRSZ];
+
+ if (ssl_x509_fingerprint_sha1(crt, fpr) == -1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return ssl_sha1_to_str(fpr, colons);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*
+ * Increment the reference count of DH parameters in a thread-safe
+ * manner.
+ */
+void
+ssl_dh_refcount_inc(DH *dh)
+{
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ CRYPTO_add(&dh->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_DH);
+#else /* !OPENSSL_THREADS */
+ DH_up_ref(dh);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_THREADS */
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+/*
+ * Increment the reference count of an X509 certificate in a thread-safe
+ * manner.
+ */
+void
+ssl_key_refcount_inc(EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ CRYPTO_add(&key->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+#else /* !OPENSSL_THREADS */
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(key);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_THREADS */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Increment the reference count of an X509 certificate in a thread-safe
+ * manner. This differs from X509_dup() in that it does not create new,
+ * full copy of the certificate, but only increases the reference count.
+ */
+void
+ssl_x509_refcount_inc(X509 *crt)
+{
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ CRYPTO_add(&crt->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+#else /* !OPENSSL_THREADS */
+ X509_up_ref(crt);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_THREADS */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match a URL/URI hostname against a single certificate DNS name
+ * using RFC 6125 rules (6.4.3 Checking of Wildcard Certificates):
+ *
+ * 1. The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in
+ * which the wildcard character comprises a label other than the
+ * left-most label (e.g., do not match bar.*.example.net).
+ *
+ * 2. If the wildcard character is the only character of the left-most
+ * label in the presented identifier, the client SHOULD NOT compare
+ * against anything but the left-most label of the reference
+ * identifier (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
+ * not bar.foo.example.com or example.com).
+ *
+ * 3. The client MAY match a presented identifier in which the wildcard
+ * character is not the only character of the label (e.g.,
+ * baz*.example.net and *baz.example.net and b*z.example.net would
+ * be taken to match baz1.example.net and foobaz.example.net and
+ * buzz.example.net, respectively). However, the client SHOULD NOT
+ * attempt to match a presented identifier where the wildcard
+ * character is embedded within an A-label or U-label [IDNA-DEFS] of
+ * an internationalized domain name [IDNA-PROTO].
+ *
+ * The optional partial matching in rule 3 is not implemented.
+ * Returns 1 on match, 0 on no match.
+ */
+int
+ssl_dnsname_match(const char *certname, size_t certnamesz,
+ const char *hostname, size_t hostnamesz)
+{
+ if (hostnamesz < certnamesz)
+ return 0;
+ if ((hostnamesz == certnamesz) &&
+ !memcmp(certname, hostname, certnamesz))
+ return 1;
+ if (!memcmp(certname, "xn--", 4))
+ return 0;
+ if ((certnamesz == 1) && (certname[0] == '*') &&
+ !memchr(hostname, '.', hostnamesz))
+ return 1;
+ if ((certnamesz > 2) && (certname[0] == '*') && (certname[1] == '.') &&
+ !memcmp(&certname[1],
+ &hostname[hostnamesz - (certnamesz - 1)],
+ certnamesz - 1) &&
+ (memchr(hostname, '.', hostnamesz) ==
+ &hostname[hostnamesz - (certnamesz - 1)]))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Transform a NULL-terminated hostname into a matching wildcard hostname,
+ * e.g. "test.example.org" -> "*.example.org".
+ * Returns string which must be free()'d by the caller, or NULL on error.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_wildcardify(const char *hostname)
+{
+ char *dot, *wildcarded;
+ size_t dotsz;
+
+ if (!(dot = strchr(hostname, '.')))
+ return strdup("*");
+ dotsz = strlen(dot);
+ if (!(wildcarded = malloc(dotsz + 2)))
+ return NULL;
+ wildcarded[0] = '*';
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < dotsz; i++) {
+ wildcarded[i+1] = dot[i];
+ }
+ wildcarded[dotsz+1] = '\0';
+ return wildcarded;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match DNS name against certificate subject CN and subjectAltNames DNS names.
+ * Returns 1 if any name matches, 0 if none matches.
+ */
+int
+ssl_x509_names_match(X509 *crt, const char *dnsname)
+{
+ GENERAL_NAMES *altnames;
+ char *cn;
+ size_t cnsz, dnsnamesz;
+
+ dnsnamesz = strlen(dnsname);
+
+ cn = ssl_x509_subject_cn(crt, &cnsz);
+ if (cn && ssl_dnsname_match(cn, cnsz, dnsname, dnsnamesz)) {
+ free(cn);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (cn) {
+ free(cn);
+ }
+
+ altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(crt, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0);
+ if (!altnames)
+ return 0;
+ for (int i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); i++) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+ if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
+ unsigned char *altname;
+ int altnamesz;
+ ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&altname, gn->d.dNSName);
+ altnamesz = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.dNSName);
+ if (altnamesz < 0)
+ break;
+ if (ssl_dnsname_match((char *)altname,
+ (size_t)altnamesz,
+ dnsname, dnsnamesz)) {
+ OPENSSL_free((char*)altname);
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free((char*)altname);
+ }
+ }
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a NULL terminated array of pointers to all common names found
+ * in the Subject DN CN and subjectAltNames extension (DNSName only).
+ * Caller must free returned buffer and all pointers within.
+ * Embedded NULL characters in hostnames are replaced with '!'.
+ */
+char **
+ssl_x509_names(X509 *crt)
+{
+ GENERAL_NAMES *altnames;
+ char *cn;
+ size_t cnsz;
+ char **res, **p;
+ size_t count;
+
+ cn = ssl_x509_subject_cn(crt, &cnsz);
+ altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(crt, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+ count = (altnames ? sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames) : 0) + (cn ? 2 : 1);
+ res = malloc(count * sizeof(char*));
+ if (!res)
+ return NULL;
+ p = res;
+ if (cn)
+ *(p++) = cn;
+ if (!altnames) {
+ *p = NULL;
+ return res;
+ }
+ for (int i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); i++) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+ if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
+ unsigned char *altname;
+ int altnamesz;
+
+ ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&altname, gn->d.dNSName);
+ if (!altname)
+ break;
+ altnamesz = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.dNSName);
+ if (altnamesz < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free((char*)altname);
+ break;
+ }
+ *p = malloc(altnamesz + 1);
+ if (!*p) {
+ OPENSSL_free((char*)altname);
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+ for (p = res; *p; p++)
+ free(*p);
+ free(res);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ for (int j = 0; j < altnamesz; j++) {
+ (*p)[j] = altname[j] ? altname[j] : '!';
+ }
+ (*p)[altnamesz] = '\0';
+ OPENSSL_free((char*)altname);
+ p++;
+ }
+ }
+ *p = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+ return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a printable representation of a certificate's common names found
+ * in the Subject DN CN and subjectAltNames extension, separated by slashes.
+ * Caller must free returned buffer.
+ * Embedded NULL characters in hostnames are replaced with '!'.
+ * If no CN and no subjectAltNames are found, returns "-".
+ */
+char *
+ssl_x509_names_to_str(X509 *crt)
+{
+ char **names;
+ size_t sz;
+ char *buf = NULL, *next;
+
+ names = ssl_x509_names(crt);
+ if (!names)
+ return strdup("-");
+
+ sz = 0;
+ for (char **p = names; *p; p++) {
+ sz += strlen(*p) + 1;
+ }
+ if (!sz) {
+ goto out1;
+ }
+
+ if (!(buf = malloc(sz)))
+ goto out2;
+ next = buf;
+ for (char **p = names; *p; p++) {
+ char *src = *p;
+ while (*src) {
+ *next++ = *src++;
+ }
+ *next++ = '/';
+ }
+ *--next = '\0';
+out2:
+ for (char **p = names; *p; p++)
+ free(*p);
+out1:
+ free(names);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a zero-terminated buffer containing the ASN1 IA5 string.
+ * Returned buffer must be free()'d by caller.
+ */
+static char *
+ssl_ia5string_strdup(ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5)
+{
+ char *str;
+
+ if (!ia5 || !ia5->length)
+ return NULL;
+ str = malloc(ia5->length + 1);
+ if (!str)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(str, ia5->data, ia5->length);
+ str[ia5->length] = 0;
+ return str;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a NULL terminated array of pointers to copies of Authority
+ * Information Access (AIA) URLs of a given type contained in the certificate.
+ * Caller must free returned buffer and all pointers within.
+ */
+char **
+ssl_x509_aias(X509 *crt, const int type)
+{
+ AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *aias;
+ char **res;
+ int count, i, j;
+
+ aias = X509_get_ext_d2i(crt, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!aias || !(count = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aias)))
+ return NULL;
+
+ res = malloc((count + 1) * sizeof(char *));
+ if (!res) {
+ sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(aias, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *aia;
+
+ aia = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aias, i);
+ if (aia &&
+ OBJ_obj2nid(aia->method) == type &&
+ aia->location->type == GEN_URI) {
+ res[j] = ssl_ia5string_strdup(aia->location->d.ia5);
+ if (res[j])
+ j++;
+ }
+ }
+ res[j] = NULL;
+ sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(aias, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free);
+ return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a NULL terminated array of pointers to copies of Authority
+ * Information Access (AIA) URLs of type OCSP contained in the certificate.
+ * Caller must free returned buffer and all pointers within.
+ */
+char **
+ssl_x509_ocsps(X509 *crt)
+{
+ return ssl_x509_aias(crt, NID_ad_OCSP);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the certificate is valid based on current time.
+ * Return 1 if valid, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+ssl_x509_is_valid(X509 *crt)
+{
+ if (X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notAfter(crt)) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notBefore(crt)) > 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print X509 certificate data to a newly allocated string.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ * Returns NULL on errors.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_x509_to_str(X509 *crt)
+{
+ BIO *bio;
+ char *p, *ret;
+ size_t sz;
+
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (!bio)
+ return NULL;
+ X509_print(bio, crt);
+ sz = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &p);
+ if (!(ret = malloc(sz + 1))) {
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memcpy(ret, p, sz);
+ ret[sz] = '\0';
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert X509 certificate to PEM format in a newly allocated string.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ * Returns NULL on errors.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_x509_to_pem(X509 *crt)
+{
+ BIO *bio;
+ char *p, *ret;
+ size_t sz;
+
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (!bio)
+ return NULL;
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, crt);
+ sz = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &p);
+ if (!(ret = malloc(sz + 1))) {
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memcpy(ret, p, sz);
+ ret[sz] = '\0';
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print SSL_SESSION data to a newly allocated string.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ * Returns NULL on errors.
+ */
+char *
+ssl_session_to_str(SSL_SESSION *sess)
+{
+ BIO *bio;
+ char *p, *ret;
+ size_t sz;
+
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (!bio)
+ return NULL;
+ SSL_SESSION_print(bio, sess);
+ sz = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &p); /* sets p to internal buffer */
+ if (!(ret = malloc(sz + 1))) {
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memcpy(ret, p, sz);
+ ret[sz] = '\0';
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns non-zero if the session timeout has not expired yet,
+ * zero if the session has expired or an error occured.
+ */
+int
+ssl_session_is_valid(SSL_SESSION *sess)
+{
+ time_t curtimet;
+ long curtime, timeout;
+
+ curtimet = time(NULL);
+ if (curtimet == (time_t)-1)
+ return 0;
+ curtime = curtimet;
+ if ((curtime < 0) || ((time_t)curtime != curtimet))
+ return 0;
+ timeout = SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(sess);
+ if (curtime < timeout)
+ return 0;
+ return (SSL_SESSION_get_time(sess) > curtime - timeout);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if buf contains a DER encoded OCSP request which can be parsed.
+ * Returns 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+ssl_is_ocspreq(const unsigned char *buf, size_t sz)
+{
+ OCSP_REQUEST *req;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ p = (const unsigned char *)buf;
+ req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST(NULL, &p, sz); /* increments p */
+ if (!req)
+ return 0;
+ OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ugly hack to manually parse a clientHello message from a memory buffer.
+ * This is needed in order to be able to support SNI and STARTTLS.
+ *
+ * The OpenSSL SNI API only allows to read the indicated server name at the
+ * time when we have to provide the server certificate. OpenSSL does not
+ * allow to asynchroniously read the indicated server name, wait for some
+ * unrelated event to happen, and then later to provide the server certificate
+ * to use and continue the handshake. Therefore we resort to parsing the
+ * server name from the ClientHello manually before OpenSSL gets to work on it.
+ *
+ * For STARTTLS support in autossl mode, we need to peek into the buffer of
+ * received octets and decide whether we have something that resembles a
+ * (possibly incomplete) ClientHello message, so we can upgrade the connection
+ * to SSL automatically.
+ *
+ * This function takes a buffer containing (part of) a ClientHello message as
+ * seen on the network as input.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 if buf does not contain a complete ClientHello message;
+ * *clienthello may point to the start of a truncated ClientHello message,
+ * indicating that the caller should retry later with more bytes available
+ * 0 if buf contains a complete ClientHello message;
+ * *clienthello will point to the start of the complete ClientHello message
+ *
+ * If a servername pointer was supplied by the caller, and a server name
+ * extension was found and parsed, the server name is returned in *servername
+ * as a newly allocated string that must be freed by the caller. This may
+ * only occur for a return value of 0.
+ *
+ * If search is non-zero, then the buffer will be searched for a ClientHello
+ * message beginning at offsets >= 0, whereas if search is zero, only
+ * ClientHello messages starting at offset 0 will be considered.
+ *
+ * This code currently supports SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0-1.2.
+ *
+ * References:
+ * draft-hickman-netscape-ssl-00: The SSL Protocol
+ * RFC 6101: The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0
+ * RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0
+ * RFC 3546: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions
+ * RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1
+ * RFC 4366: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions
+ * RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
+ * RFC 6066: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions
+ */
+int
+ssl_tls_clienthello_parse(const unsigned char *buf, ssize_t sz, int search,
+ const unsigned char **clienthello, char **servername)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG_CLIENTHELLO_PARSER
+#define DBG_printf(...) log_dbg_printf("ClientHello parser: " __VA_ARGS__)
+#else /* !DEBUG_CLIENTHELLO_PARSER */
+#define DBG_printf(...)
+#endif /* !DEBUG_CLIENTHELLO_PARSER */
+ const unsigned char *p = buf;
+ ssize_t n = sz;
+ char *sn = NULL;
+
+ ssize_t tlsextslen;
+ ssize_t sidlen;
+ ssize_t suiteslen;
+ ssize_t compslen;
+ ssize_t msglen;
+ ssize_t recordlen;
+
+ //=====
+
+ *clienthello = NULL;
+
+ DBG_printf("parsing buffer of sz %zd\n", sz);
+
+ do {
+ if (*clienthello) {
+ /*
+ * Rewind after skipping an invalid ClientHello by
+ * restarting the search one byte after the beginning
+ * of the last candidate
+ */
+ p = (*clienthello) + 1;
+ n = sz - (p - buf);
+ if (sn) {
+ free(sn);
+ sn = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (search) {
+ /* Search for a potential ClientHello */
+ while ((n > 0) && (*p != 0x16) && (*p != 0x80)) {
+ p++; n--;
+ }
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ /* Search completed without a match; reset
+ * clienthello to NULL to indicate to the
+ * caller that this buffer does not need to be
+ * retried */
+ DBG_printf("===> No match:"
+ " rv 1, *clienthello NULL\n");
+ *clienthello = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ *clienthello = p;
+ DBG_printf("candidate at offset %td\n", p - buf);
+
+ DBG_printf("byte 0: %02x\n", *p);
+ /* +0 0x80 +2 0x01 SSLv2 short header, clientHello;
+ * +0 0x16 +1 0x03 SSLv3/TLSv1.x handshake, clientHello */
+ if (*p == 0x80) {
+ /* SSLv2 handled here */
+ p++; n--;
+
+ if (n < 10) { /* length + 9 */
+ DBG_printf("===> [SSLv2] Truncated:"
+ " rv 1, *clienthello set\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ DBG_printf("length: %02x\n", p[0]);
+ if (n - 1 < p[0]) {
+ DBG_printf("===> [SSLv2] Truncated:"
+ " rv 1, *clienthello set\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ p++; n--;
+
+ DBG_printf("msgtype: %02x\n", p[0]);
+ if (*p != 0x01)
+ continue;
+ p++; n--;
+
+ DBG_printf("version: %02x %02x\n", p[0], p[1]);
+ /* byte order is actually swapped for SSLv2 */
+ if (!(
+#ifdef HAVE_SSLV2
+ (p[0] == 0x00 && p[1] == 0x02) ||
+#endif /* HAVE_SSLV2 */
+ (p[0] == 0x03 && p[1] <= 0x03)))
+ continue;
+ p += 2; n -= 2;
+
+ DBG_printf("cipher-spec-len: %02x %02x\n", p[0], p[1]);
+ ssize_t cipherspec_len = p[0] << 8 | p[1];
+ p += 2; n -= 2;
+
+ DBG_printf("session-id-len: %02x %02x\n", p[0], p[1]);
+ ssize_t sessionid_len = p[0] << 8 | p[1];
+ p += 2; n -= 2;
+
+ DBG_printf("challenge-len: %02x %02x\n", p[0], p[1]);
+ ssize_t challenge_len = p[0] << 8 | p[1];
+ p += 2; n -= 2;
+ if (challenge_len < 16 || challenge_len > 32)
+ continue;
+
+ if (n < cipherspec_len
+ + sessionid_len
+ + challenge_len) {
+ DBG_printf("===> [SSLv2] Truncated:"
+ " rv 1, *clienthello set\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ p += cipherspec_len + sessionid_len + challenge_len;
+ n -= cipherspec_len + sessionid_len + challenge_len;
+ goto done_parsing;
+ } else
+ if (*p != 0x16) {
+ /* this can only happen if search is 0 */
+ DBG_printf("===> No match: rv 1, *clienthello NULL\n");
+ *clienthello = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ p++; n--;
+
+ if (n < 2) {
+ DBG_printf("===> Truncated: rv 1, *clienthello set\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ DBG_printf("version: %02x %02x\n", p[0], p[1]);
+ /* This supports up to TLS 1.2 (0x03 0x03) and will need to be
+ * updated for TLS 1.3 once that is standardized and still
+ * compatible with this parser; remember to also update the
+ * inner version check below */
+ if (p[0] != 0x03 || p[1] > 0x03)
+ continue;
+ p += 2; n -= 2;
+
+ if (n < 2) {
+ DBG_printf("===> Truncated: rv 1, *clienthello set\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ DBG_printf("length: %02x %02x\n", p[0], p[1]);
+
+ recordlen = p[1] + (p[0] << 8);
+ DBG_printf("recordlen=%zd\n", recordlen);
+ p += 2; n -= 2;
+ if (recordlen < 36) /* arbitrary size too small for a c-h */
+ continue;
+ if (n < recordlen) {
+ DBG_printf("n < recordlen: n=%zd\n", n);
+ DBG_printf("===> Truncated: rv 1, *clienthello set\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* from here we give up on a candidate if there is not enough
+ * data available in the buffer, because we already checked the
+ * availability of the whole record. */
+
+ if (n < 1)
+ continue;
+ DBG_printf("message type: %i\n", *p);
+ if (*p != 0x01) /* message type: ClientHello */
+ continue;
+ p++; n--;
+
+ if (n < 3)
+ continue;
+ DBG_printf("message len: %02x %02x %02x\n", p[0], p[1], p[2]);
+ msglen = p[2] + (p[1] << 8) + (p[0] << 16);
+ DBG_printf("msglen=%zd\n", msglen);
+ p += 3; n -= 3;
+ if (msglen < 32) /* arbitrary size too small for a c-h */
+ continue;
+ if (msglen != recordlen - 4) {
+ DBG_printf("msglen != recordlen - 4\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (n < msglen)
+ continue;
+ n = msglen; /* only parse first message */
+
+ if (n < 2)
+ continue;
+ DBG_printf("clienthello version %02x %02x\n", p[0], p[1]);
+ /* inner version check, see outer one above */
+ if (p[0] != 0x03 || p[1] > 0x03)
+ continue;
+ p += 2; n -= 2;
+
+ if (n < 32)
+ continue;
+ DBG_printf("clienthello random %02x %02x %02x %02x ...\n",
+ p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]);
+ DBG_printf("compare localtime: %08x\n",
+ (unsigned int)time(NULL));
+ p += 32; n -= 32;
+
+ if (n < 1)
+ continue;
+ DBG_printf("clienthello sidlen %02x\n", *p);
+ sidlen = *p; /* session id length, 0..32 */
+ p += 1; n -= 1;
+ if (n < sidlen)
+ continue;
+ p += sidlen; n -= sidlen;
+
+ if (n < 2)
+ continue;
+ DBG_printf("clienthello cipher suites length %02x %02x\n",
+ p[0], p[1]);
+
+ suiteslen = p[1] + (p[0] << 8);
+ p += 2; n -= 2;
+ if (n < suiteslen)
+ continue;
+ p += suiteslen;
+ n -= suiteslen;
+
+ if (n < 1)
+ continue;
+ DBG_printf("clienthello compress methods length %02x\n", *p);
+
+ compslen = *p;
+ p++; n--;
+ if (n < compslen)
+ continue;
+ p += compslen;
+ n -= compslen;
+
+ /* begin of extensions */
+
+ if (n == 0) {
+ /* valid ClientHello without extensions */
+ DBG_printf("===> Match: rv 0, *clienthello set\n");
+ if (servername)
+ *servername = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (n < 2)
+ continue;
+ DBG_printf("tlsexts length %02x %02x\n", p[0], p[1]);
+ tlsextslen = p[1] + (p[0] << 8);
+ DBG_printf("tlsextslen %zd\n", tlsextslen);
+ p += 2; n -= 2;
+ if (n < tlsextslen)
+ continue;
+ n = tlsextslen; /* only parse exts, ignore trailing bits */
+
+ while (n > 0) {
+ if (n < 4)
+ goto continue_search;
+ DBG_printf("tlsext type %02x %02x len %02x %02x\n",
+ p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]);
+ unsigned short exttype = p[1] + (p[0] << 8);
+ ssize_t extlen = p[3] + (p[2] << 8);
+ p += 4; n -= 4;
+ if (n < extlen)
+ goto continue_search;
+ switch (exttype) {
+ case 0: {
+ ssize_t extn = extlen;
+ const unsigned char *extp = p;
+
+ if (extn < 2)
+ goto continue_search;
+ DBG_printf("list length %02x %02x\n",
+ extp[0], extp[1]);
+ ssize_t namelistlen = extp[1] + (extp[0] << 8);
+ DBG_printf("namelistlen = %zd\n", namelistlen);
+ extp += 2;
+ extn -= 2;
+
+ if (namelistlen != extn)
+ goto continue_search;
+
+ while (extn > 0) {
+ if (extn < 3)
+ goto continue_search;
+ DBG_printf("ServerName type %02x"
+ " len %02x %02x\n",
+ extp[0], extp[1], extp[2]);
+ unsigned char sntype = extp[0];
+ ssize_t snlen = extp[2] + (extp[1]<<8);
+ extp += 3;
+ extn -= 3;
+ if (snlen > extn)
+ goto continue_search;
+ if (snlen > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
+ goto continue_search;
+ /*
+ * We copy the first name only.
+ * RFC 6066: "The ServerNameList MUST
+ * NOT contain more than one name of
+ * the same name_type."
+ */
+ if (servername &&
+ sntype == 0 && sn == NULL) {
+ sn = malloc(snlen + 1);
+ memcpy(sn, extp, snlen);
+ sn[snlen] = '\0';
+ /* deliberately not checking
+ * for malformed hostnames
+ * containing invalid chars */
+ }
+ extp += snlen;
+ extn -= snlen;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ DBG_printf("skipped\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ p += extlen;
+ n -= extlen;
+ } /* while have more extensions */
+
+done_parsing:
+ ;
+#ifdef DEBUG_CLIENTHELLO_PARSER
+ if (n > 0) {
+ DBG_printf("unparsed next bytes %02x %02x %02x %02x\n",
+ p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]);
+ }
+#endif /* DEBUG_CLIENTHELLO_PARSER */
+ DBG_printf("%zd bytes unparsed\n", n);
+
+ /* Valid ClientHello with or without server name */
+ DBG_printf("===> Match: rv 0, *clienthello set\n");
+ if (servername)
+ *servername = sn;
+ return 0;
+continue_search:
+ ;
+ } while (search && n > 0);
+
+ /* No valid ClientHello messages found, not even a truncated one */
+ DBG_printf("===> No match: rv 1, *clienthello NULL\n");
+ *clienthello = NULL;
+ if (sn) {
+ free(sn);
+ sn = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* vim: set noet ft=c: */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-12-30 16:09:42 +0000